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This paper answers the question of why decentralization reform was initiated in ~ communist I
system like China by analyzing the norms and institutions of the Chinese planned economy, where the :
ruling elites have been engaged in contrived-surplus-seeking activities.
I argue that the centrally-controlled under-supply of goods at fixed prices below market clearance
creates a contrived surplus somewhat analogous to the consumer surplus or rent generated in competitive
market exchanges. The economic policy-making procedure and the politics of reciprocal accountability :
in China allow a trade of the authority to control and/or to enjoy the benefits of the contrived surplus !
among three groups of the ruling elites, i.e. the central leaders, the central ministerial bureaucrats, and '
the provincial officials. Central leaders adopt different economic policies to reallocate this contrived
surplus to selected groups in exchange for preferential access to another short-supplied good, e.g. votes
or political support, controlled by the targeted population. Decentralization is one form of reallocating '
authority over the contrived surplus.
·
!
In surplus seeking, the exchange of favors produces mutual private benefits at the expense of the :
third party. As a result, there is an irresistible tendency for it to be consummated especially in power :
struggles and succession crises. In fact, the decentralized (kuaikuai) versus centralized (tiaotiao) planning'
and administrative systems are two major approaches that the Chinese leaders have used for soliciting '
political support as well as hurting political rivals.

Contemporary Chinese history h.iis s,een three large-scale decentralization reforms during the years
leading to the Great Leap Forward, the 'cultural Revolution, and the post-Mao Refo~m Decade,
respectively. Prior to the Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong started to call for decentralization to solicit
political support from provincial Party secretaries. The decentralizers used the kuaikuai planning/
administrative system to predominate economic policy-making authority, which had expanded in favor.
of the central planners in the Soviet-style industrialization during the First Five-Year Plan. Before and
during the Cultural Revolution, Mao aligned with the military and again provincial leaders, and launched:
decentralization programs to expel the central planners. In the post-Mao period, Chinese leaders Deng,
Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang applied different decentralization policies to hurt political rivals. and to offer,
benefits to supporters and potential supporters.
This paper does not argue for a mono-causal factor of decentralization, but concludes that,
decentralization has b.een used by the central leaders to solicit political support and to reduce the power:
of rivals, and that decentralization results from successful political alignment between some central leaders,
and provincial officials.
I

THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF DECENTRALIZATION
IN CONTEMPORARY CIIlNA1

INTRODUCTION

Within the first forty years of the People's Republic of China, Chinese central leadhs launched:
'

three major decentralization reforms. Decentralization--i.e. the devolution of administrative authority
from a central or high level to a local or lower level in the governmental hierarchy--has been one of the
essential components of Deng Xiaoping's economic reform strategy. This paper addresses the question
of why decentralization occurred in China, a system characterized by the Leninist Party-state and the
Stalinist planned economy. Why is the central government willing to share its power

ov~r economic i

decision-making with localities?

In Totalitarian Models2 and Power Models', the central government only accumulates power,.
but does not decentralize its authority. Marxist models4 would see the local government as the extension
of the central metaphor, which results in an undifferentiated assimilation of all governmental agencies into
an apparently monolithic "state apparatus." In this monolithic state apparatus, the central-local distinction
often disappears. Many other explanations of decentralization fall into the line of the efficiencry argument,
which attributes decentralization to the drive for economic efficiency and maintains that decentralization:
would reduce the transaction costs of the central planning. 5 In reality, however, decentralization does:
not necessarily increase efficiency.' The Great Leap Forward (1957-1959), in which China attempted:
rapid industrialization, is a counter example against the efficiency argument. Moreover, ~ome central:
governments still grow significantly under decentralization reforms. 7 During the Dengist reform decade:
I

'

(1978-1989) in China, the average annual increase in the number of government cadres reac;hed a record;
'

point of 330,000 per year, compared with an average increase of 110,000 per year before 1980. By the'
end of 1986, the total staff of Chinese government offices and organizations was 7.34 ihi!!ion, 78.2;

1

percent higher than that in 1979. Government administrative expenditures in China increased over the
'
same period by 250 percent. 8

I

In this paper, I will first examine the characteristics of the Chinese planned

econom~ and politic~
I

:

rules. In so doing, I argue that decentralization reallocates the authority of distributing coqtrived surpl~s
produced by the planned economy.

.
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~
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I will then illustrate this argument by investigating three
I

decentralization reforms from 1957 to 1960, from 1965 to 1971, and from 1977 to 1989 in China. This
,

I

I

paper does not concern the "state capacity" to recentralize; nor does it assume that decentralization is th~

.

only political game played in China. It, however, explores the political mechanisms of

'

eco~omic
refornJs
,
I
I

I

by focusing on these three cases of decentralization. I will show that decentralization has been initiate!!
1

by the central leaders as a policy instrument to solicit political support and to hurt political rivals.

I

II

'

I

DEcENTRALizATION REALWCATES THE AUTHORITY OF DISTRIBUTING CONTRIVED SuRl'LUS I

!

Two features characterize the economy in
contemporary China: (1) scarcity of goods and
services, and (2). central planning or rationing.

Price

I'

Rationing of the scarce goods and services by the
government may

I

aim at an efficient, and

I

These two

I

features, i.e. the centrally controlled low supply

I
I
I

of goods at fixed prices below market clearance

.· '

sometimes "fair,." distribution.9

--·1

and high demand of these goods, however, create

Q(•I

a contrived surplus (P,PjJA) somewhat analogous
to the consumer surplus or rent generated in

Figure 1: Contrived Surplus
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competitive market exchanges (see Figure 1). In other words, when the selling price of a good is
artificially set below the market-clearing level through government price controls, the price gap (P1 - P;J
represents a contrived surplus. It is contrived because it arises from an artificially lowered money price

I
(P;J rather than from a market-clearing price, and because it derives from the rationing irn~osed by the
'

government plan. It is a surplus because some buyers would be prepared to pay up to the mar~et-clearing
price (P,) to get the goods'in short supply. 10 Although high money payments to obtain these goods and
services are not allowed in most cases because of the control over the price of and the access to them in
the planned economy, additional resources are nonetheless mobilized to determine who gets ,the rationed
goods. These additional resources include bribery, lobbying, or non-monetary favors.

We can easily appreciate how such non-market "bidding" may take place. Suppose the "seller"
offers the access to the rationed good, e.g. coal, in exchange for preferential access to another shortsupplied good--e.g. votes, political support, or personal loyalty--controlled by the "buyer;" the "buyer"
can then enjoy the good she desires and the "seller" can be rewarded with another limited good which .
the "buyer" controls. Economic benefits can thus be used to favor someone for political returns. Since
this simple exchange of favors produces mutual private benefits at the expense of the third party, there
is an irresistible tendency for it to be consummated especially where legal reinforcement i~ very weak
and where the contracting parties can override the legal system, i.e. as in China.

In the case under study, the "seller" is, of course, the Chinese government or its agents, and the,

return solicited is indeed political. The economics of allocating the contrived surplus to selected "buyers"
constitutes a political game. Decentralization reform is obviously one form of this game. ·

In an economy where all major producer and consumer goods are allocated through the state and
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affiliated distribution channels, the contrived surplus created by controls over price and access does not,
for the most part, go to the consumers or producers. Instead, it goes to the "sellers," i.e. to those who :

i

I

control distribution. When the selling price of a good is artificially set below the market-clearing level
through government price controls,, the price gap represents a contrived surplus transferrk
. from the !
producer to the buyer.

But, due to a bureaucratic control over these goods, the proqucer is not !

.

.

necessarily a loser as long as she can join the ruling elites who control the distribution of these goods. :
I

This is the case in the socialist systems where enterprise directors are also cadres and they top are on the :

' resulting :
government payroll. They are not responsible for the negative profits of their enterprises, partly
'

from the central allocation of their and other products.

Not only do the government and its agents control the distribution of these good_s; they also '
manipulate the sources of contrived surplus, by changing the money price or shifting the s_upply curve '
or demand curve. For instance, the over-commitment to capital construction in China's economic plan ·
induce high demand of steel, coal, cement, etc. More important, the government or its agents can trade '
this contrived surplus for other badly needed goods, such as personal loyalty and political support, by
'

assigning property rights or opening accesses to other parties, be it local governments or heavy industry
i

.

bureaucrats. The decentralization reforms in China represent exactly this kind of practice, fof they assign 1
quasi property rights by decentralizing economic policy making authority to s'1bordinates. :
Decentralization reallocates the authority over distribution.

No single unified party can control the allocation of the contrived surplus in a

cen~ally

economy;" all players possess the incentive to change the size or the allocation channel

planned

oi this surplus'.

to acquire a greater share of the benefit. The Chinese political-economic system is not' totalitarian;
neither is it a system of dictatorship, no matter how the Chinese authority proclaims a "proletarian

I
4

'

dictatorship." In the absence of a dictatorship, the need for reform is endless, for it is impossible to
devise a means for allocating goods that can withstand the strategic assaults by individul)lly rational
agents. 12

In the absence of perfect dictatorship, people will always find it rewarding[ to seek to

1
manipulate and overturn the existing allocation system. Put in another way, insofar as perfect dictatorship

I
may never be achieved, the demands for decentralization or centralization reform will never' diminish.

i
I

The ever-existing contrived surplus on one hand, 13 and the long-lasting demands for
redistribution reform on the other hand, give rise to immense opportunities for surplus seeking activities
in form of decentralization reform. Since this trade of favors produces mutual private benefits at the
'

expense of third parties, the government and its agents are particularly enthusiastic about such "deals" ;
to hurt its political rivals at the time of power struggle and succession crisis. At the time of legitimacy
crisis, the government and its agents also need to buy political support from subordinates.
Decentralization then becomes a prized instrument for securing political support for , the central ·
'

government and/or its agents, as well as for eliminating or minimizing the power of their political rivals ..

WHO ARE IN THE POSITION TO SEEK THE CONTRIVED SURPLUS

Generally speaking, three groups of people have been in a place that enhances their power over
the contrived surplus. They are: the top elites at the Center, 14 the bureaucrats in the central agencies
and the directors of state-owned large to medium-sized enterprises, and the provincial officials. Since
these three groups are not always the end-users of those scarce goods and services, their surplus seeking
activities have concentrated on the trading of allocation authority of contrived surplus. They want to
make economic plans, because planning and managing generate the power to allocate t\J.e contrived
surplus.

5
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From 1949, the new China started to copy the Soviet system and established a unitary central
planning economy. "Unified Leadership and Unified Management" (Tongyi Lingdao, Tongyi Guanlf) as :
'
the principle of the economic management replaced "Unified Leadership and Decentralized!' Operation" ,

(Tongyi Lingdao, Fenshan Jingying) which prevailed in the "liberated areas" (jiefang qu) before 1949."

I

i
I

I
In 1952, the State Planning Commission was established, and the First Five Year Plan (1st FYP) was ;
I

launched in 1953. The integrated and centrally controlled economic system was finally institutionalized
in China during the period of the 1st FYP. This has been a "planned economic system primarily based
on administrative coordination. "16

National economic plans in China, including five-year and annual plans, have been drawn up by '
the CCP Central Committee, with inputs from different central bureaucracies and local governments. '
This means that: the planning process in China requires a division of responsibilities according to
products and regions respectively, although these responsibilities are sometimes overlapping. Both central
agencies and local governments have enjoyed considerable power in making decisions. B'oth of them :
provide suggestions to the Center with respect to development strategies and policies concerning the
industries and products under their control.

In this way, the national economic plan has been essentially an aggregation of two fundamentally
different types of economic plans, i.e. those that are compiled according to vertical, sect\lral lines of.
administration, and those that are compiled on horizontal, territorial lines of administration. The sectoral ·
plans concern the sectoral economy on a nationwide base, and cover theoretically all entetj:lrises in the
same industry under the management of a single ministerial system, regardless of location. Enterprises
under central ministerial administration are usually large "key" enterprises and other enterprises producing
'
goods of the highest priority. These enterprises are thought to directly affect nationf!l economic
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performance. Many directors of these enterprises are considered as cadres at a high rank of up to viceminister. These directors have had a strong voice in their ministries and can influence national policies
through the ministerial channel. Under central planning, therefore, the State Planning Commission,
I

established in 1952 under the State Council, would first accommodate carefully the n~s of the ,
ministries, attempting to secure all essential flows, i.e. electric power, fuels, raw materials, equipment,
and processed materials, to each central enterprise from enterprises under other ministries aµd from the :
provinces. The ministries would coordinate production and marketing "on the basis of the state's material
distribution plan." As the central bureaucracies control more goods and enterprises through the sectoral
'

lines of administration, imbalances tend to appear as provincial, rather than central, shortfj\lls.

Territorial plans are compiled on a provincial basis. The country is divided into 30 provinces, '
including provincial level autonomous regions and directly attached municipalities. 17 The provincial
governments focus on the regional economy, and thus are multi-sectoral. However, they include only,
enterprises and institutions that are managed by local governments. Thus, with respect to management,
decentralization from central to local levels has meant transferring some or all of the enterprises formerly
managed by the plan of central ministries to the plan of provinces and municipalities, i.e. to the territorial
plans.

The Center, composed of the Politburo and the State Council, prefer a balanced economic growth ·
and a stable political integration, which would consolidate the basis of their rule. Mao Zedong, in his
article "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," claimed that one of the most prominent goals of the
I

communist regime was to maintain the national political and economic unity. According tq Mao, there
should be no fundamental conflict of interests among the "people, "18 and this unification of the
fundamental interests is based on a common goal which would be fully represented by the Communist
I

7

Party and determinedly pursued by the governments at different levels and in different regions. 19 The
'
collective preference of the Center for balanced economic growth is primarily derived from the principle ,

!
of communist egalitarianism. The individual elites at the Center, however, place a higheri priority on
their personal power than on the general political and economic preference. They would sid~ either with
one interest group or another for that matter.

This structure of national planning puts these three groups of central elites, central bureaucrats, ,
and provincial officials in a place from where they can exercise economic control. Insofar as the sectoral '
versus territorial administrations form the two primary options within a planned economy, the central
bureaucrats would prefer the sectoral lines of administration--referred to as the primacy of vertical ,
(tiaotiao) relations of exchange of information and goods, while the provincial officials would prefer the
'

'

territorial lines of administration--referred to as horizontal (kuaikual) relations. In the struggle for :
planning authority, the central ministries would also prefer more or complete sectoral management at the
ministerial level.

This configuration of planning responsibilities outlined above creates a triangular ,relationship
among the Center, the central ministries, and the provinces, with frequent intervention from the military.
Due to the dominant position it occupies, the Center is able to balance the interests of the other two
players, or to shift to align with either for political support or other benefits.'°

The significance of the two different planning/administrative approaches for surjilus seeking
should be evident. The players are compelled to retain the physical control over the scarce goods and
services, to assure themselves the access to them, or, last but not the least, to hold the authority to
allocate them. The first reason for this is that: planning and managing generate the power to allocate the

8

contrived surplus.

In a planned economy like the Chinese one, economic policy making authority

includes decisions concerning investment, production, the allocation of producer

goo~s

and the ,

distribution of income, employment, and consumption. In principle, the planning authoritiJ control all

I

physical productive resources, including land, labor, buildings, machinery, and other capital goods. The :
j

planners directly or indirectly control all enterprises.

In theory, and many a time in practice, the

planning authorities assign a production target to each production unit, and tell it how much of each good
to produce, to whom to sell, and from whom to purchase.

The second reason can be seen in the following. Some actors are direct-users of these goods,
such as local governments and some central ministries; some are not, such as central leaders and some
other central ministries. For instance, the ministries of electric power, transportation, and construction
materials are among the direct-users of coal, but not the State Planning Commission and ·the Central .
'
Bureau of Materials. However, they are all interested in the benefits of the contrived surplus' created by
I

allocation of coal. In theory, the controllers of the scarce goods and services, i.e. enterprise directors
and administrative bureaucrats, should not have any power to distribute these goods and services at their '
own will in a planned economy. In practice, however, these controllers can always manage to retain
some of these goods and services out of the planning, by reporting the production output lower than the
actual and/or not fulfilling the delivery plan by a hundred percent. 21 While controlling the scarce goods
and services out of the plan in this manner, the players actually could enjoy and have the power to
reallocate the contrived surplus. In another manner, players also want to assure

themselv~

the access

to the scarce goods and services, since this access would give them the privilege to enjoy the contrived .
I
I

surplus as a buyer, or to reallocate them as a "middle person." In short, the utmost goal for all these
players is to acquire the power to allocate the contrived surplus.

9
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Producers, including coal mines and coal bureaux, articulated their interests at both central
ministerial and provincial levels. In a planned economy like China, where selling does not, necessarily '
transfer the profits to the producers, the producers need not care about the

~rice of their prodJcts, or they :

would join other interests looking for a fixed low price of their own products. Since the

~roducers in

China always can control the allocation of some, though a tiny percentage, of their own

~roducts no

1

'

matter how rigid the planning is, the lower the price of their own products, the larger the contrived '
I

'

surplus they can control.

In this case, all parties--the provinces, the coal ministry and other ministries--are always looking ,
'

:

for less allocation by central planning, but more allocation by the provincial governments, or the
ministries of the products. There has been not only a conflict between the provinces and the ministries,
'

but also conflicts among central ministries. Each ministry wishes more ministerial allocatiop. of its own
products, yet more central allocation of products under the control of other ministries, for thi~ means easy
access for this ministry. The Ministry of Coal Industry wishes more ministerial allocation lof coal, but ,
I

all the user ministries wishes more central control so as to secure the supply of coal for th€/m.

NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS THAT SHAPE THE SURPLUS SEEKING ACTIVITIES

As we have seen in the above that the Center assumes a dominant position in the triangular
relationship among the three ruling elites. If so, why does the Center want to decentralize its power? '
To answer this question, we need to look at the political rules in China, the political rules by, which these
three ruling elites have played and by which their behavior patterns have been shaped. There are at least

'
four important political norms and institutions that have shaped the elite behavior in gene~al and their

'

surplus-seeking activities in particular.

10

No fixed terms of office yet legitimacy through persuasion and bargaining that have led to
constantly campaign for support

!'

I
I

The competition for political leadership is almost constant in communist states, since the
legitimacy of it is not well institutionalized. The top positions are not strictly regulated by !fixed terms ,
'
of office. Even after one has attained the position of Party leader, he has to worry about keeping it. The '
Party leader can never be entirely secure because at any time one of his lieutenants might overthrow him.
Or to put it in an extreme way as did some scholars, "whenever one faction rises to power in China, .
another waits in the wings to overthrow it. This has been the case with the rightist reformers who, under
the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, succeeded in capturing power from Mao's self-appointed su~essor Hua ,
Guofeng in 1978 ... [then,] the leftist hard-liners waited in the wings to usurp power from the rightleaning Dengists, "22 and they succeeded on a couple of occasions during the Dengist reform era, e.g. '
in January 1987, in September 1988, and in June 4, 1989.

Moreover, the legitimacy of a leadership is built upon consensus building through pe~suasion and ·
bargaining.

Mao Zedong constantly solicited political support through consensus building at the

Governors Conferences (Sheng:dlang Huiyi). Almost every summer during the Dengist ref9rm era, the

Beidaihe meeting at a beach resort highlights efforts at consensus building among top leaders. But this
consensus could be broken up at any moment. And it broke up for the support of former CCP Chairman
Hua Guofeng, of former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang, and of former CCP General Secretary
Zhao Ziyang.

I

Since leadership posts at the Center have no fixed terms of office and the legitimacy of a
leadership is built through persuasion and bargaining, all leaders, incumbents as well as challengers, must
constantly campaign for the support of Party, government, and military officials.

11

The "selectorate" politics that has created a reciprocal accountability between the top leaders
and their subordinates
In China, central leaders are "chosen not by an electorate but by what we n\ight call a
I

'selectorate,' a term adopted from British parliamentary politics to define the group
party that has effective power to choose leaders.'"'

withi~ a political· :

'
The CCP Central Committee constitutes the

i

selectorate, and the CCP Central Committee is composed primarily by those officials who are holding ,
leading positions in Central Communist Party and government, local Party and governments, and the
People's Liberation Army. In other words, the majority of the members in the selectorate consists of the
other two "non-dominant" groups of players in the triangular game of the Center, the ministries, and the
provinces, and the top leaders have to win their support. Besides, some Party elders, who retired from :
the CCP Central Committee to the CCP Central Advisory Commission and the CCP Central Commission ·
for Discipline Inspection during the Dengist reform era, should also be considered as important members
of the selectorate. The legitimacy of a leadership in China is based mainly on the support of immediate ,
superiors and subordinates.

Top leaders, i.e. the members of Politburo, 24 are elected by the Central Committee, while
officials in the Central Committee are appointed by the top leaders and rely on the top leaders for their
promotion. The relationship between the officials in the selectorate and the top Party leaders is one of
reciprocal accountability; each must satisfy the other to remain in office.

The blurring between politics and administration that has made policies a major weapon in
the struggle for power
While the success of the central elites counts on the support from their comrades in the Party,
'
the Government, and the military system, realization of central policies depends upon the implementation

12

and accomplishment by the whole country, effectively organized into central bureaucracies and local
governments. In a Leninist regime, where there is no distinction between politics and administration, the
'

:

'

struggle for power therefore continues concurrently with the struggles over policy, and polici~ are major '
I

weapons in the struggle for power.

25

Since power and policy are fused in Leninist polities and there '
:

'

is no open competition for office, the contest for power is hidden in the process of bureaucratic politics.
'

Because central leaders are accountable to selectorate consisting of central bureaucratic and local
government officials, central leaders possess an incentive to appeal to these officials by offering policy
benefits. Central leaders prefer expansionary policies that enable them to give away policy benefits to '
I

as many bureaucratic groups as possible, be they in central ministries or local governments. And central
leaders avoid policies that retract benefits from potential supporters.

To use the terminology in the study of democratic politics, voters often do not vote for individual .
candidates, but for their policies. When one's policy is favored, he or she would automatically be in
power. And, the willingness of the bureaucrats to support and implement central policies determine to
a large extent the success of these policies.

Ideological constraints
While offering policy benefits, the central leaders do not want to imperil the political consensus
upon which the regime vests. In other words, the competition for political leadership is conducted within
a political consensus of the rule of the Communist Party and its commitment to the socialist system. This
political consensus has been built up by the revolutionary veterans who have shed their blood in the
course of building a new China. Even during the most liberal years of the Dengist reform, the "Four '
Fundamental Principles" was inserted into the constitution in 1982 and have held tight against later
challenges.

13

Like other communist theories, the Chinese orthodox economic theories regard public, i.e. state,
ownership, as the unshakable column of the socialist system, and government planning of investment,
I

I
distribution, price, etc., as the core economic mechanism. The implication is clear: that ih a planned

-

I

' authority
economy, the policy benefit the central leaders can offer is the contrived surplus itself or ~e
I
to allocate it, without changing the planning mechanism and state ownership .. Decentralization to local
officials and recentralization to ministerial officials are the ways to allocate the contrived surplus. In
'

other words, in the game of reallocating the control over contrived surplus, the ruling elites possess only
two options, i.e. the sectoral versus the territorial administration. The balance between two fundamental
different approaches of tiaotiao and kuaikuai in planning and administration would change the power
distribution among these three groups of elites in the Center, the ministries, and the provinces.

There have been "theoretical" breakthroughs on issues of ownership and of economic 111echanisms
'
26
other than rigid planning since the beginning of the Dengist reforms. However, these "theoretical,"
I

ideological in effect, breakthroughs do not eliminate the contrived surplus created by (central) government ,
planning, nor do they abolish the reciprocity politics. These breakthroughs give other groups, e.g. '

'

municipal mayors, a chance to join the competition for sharing of contrived surplus.,

Or these :

breakthroughs provide those privileged three groups with more contrived surplus.

To summarize, these political norms and institutions discussed above create a power :struggle for
allocative authority within the Chinese ruling elites. Since this power struggle concentrates oµ the trading
I
of allocation authority of contrived surplus, two issues are at hand: first, who should physically control
I

the good, i.e. the quasi-ownership; second, who is entitled to make economic policies, e.g. the authority ·

:

to price and to decide distribution directions and channels. Changes between sectoral vers\ls territorial
approaches of handling these two issues, i.e. fluctuation of decentralization versus recentralization,
I

14

II
I

~

represent phases in the struggle for power and attempts by the central leaders to solicit political support.

How TO SEEK THE

CONTRIVED

SURPLUS: A

HisrORICAL

BRIEFING
I

There are several forms of surplus seeking activity. However, decentralization provides an

.'

effective exchange of contrived surplus on a large scale between the central leaders and their

.

subordinates. In a zero-SuJU game between the tiaotiao and kuaikuai competition, the central leaders find
decentralization advantageous, for it provides an exchange of favors at the expense of their

~ivals,

such

as central bureaucrats or Party secretaries.

Table 1: Periods in the History of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 1949-1995
Year

Period

Overall Economic Policy

1949-52
1953-57

Socialist Transition
Centralized Planning:
The 1st Five-Year Plan
Decentralization Reform:
The Great Leap Forward
Recentralization:
Readjustment & recovery
Decentralization:
The Cultural Revolution
Recentralization & the "Gang
of Four" Radicalism
Decentralization mixed with
Recentralization
Substantial Decentralization:
Economic System Reform
Recentralization:
Anti-Peaceful Conversion
Liberalization:
The Socialist Market Economy

Rebuilding the economic order
Soviet-style industrialization

1957-60
1961-65
1965-71
1971-76
1977-82
1982-89
1989-92
1992-95

Maoist General Guideline of develop~ent stressing :
"Quantity, Speed, Quality, and Efficiency"
Reversal to balanced development & acpninistrative ;
planning and management
"Politics takes the command," and "the Third
Front" military development strategy
Attempts to resume "regular" centriµ planning
versus policy of "Revolution over production"
Hua's new Great Leap Forward, and
Deng's "Scientific Spring"
·Separation of the Party and Government, &
of the Government and enterprises
Retrenchment & slowing down the r~form speed:
"China to save socialism"
Marketization, & officials' engagement in
the Third Sectoral Economy

There are at least two different kinds of decentralization programs. The first is a delegation of
decision making authority from the Party secretaries to administrators in the government and to the

!
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directors in the enterprises, or the so-called "dang zheng fenjia" (separation of the Party and the
Government administration). This form results in a clear decline of the Party's administrative power and :
I

a clear increase of power of the State Council and professionals. The second involves a

I
d~legation

,

of :

I

decision making authority from some central point (e.g. the State Council and/or central ministries) to :
I

'

I

local government administrations and local departments, or the so-called "lishun zhongyang yu difang '

guanxi" (straightening-out of the relationship between the central and local governments). This form :
constitutes administrative decentralization. Both programs have been attempted in communist China.
'

Soon after taking power, the Government Administrative Council27 issued a "Resolution on
I

Unifying State Financial and Economic Work" in March 1950, which put all financial revenues and ·
expenditures, material allocation and distribution, and cash management under the control of the central
government. 28 Although local authorities were formally recognized to have superior information that

'

1

would enable them to draw up local plans that would take their unique local factors into account, 29 the ,
First Five-Year Plan period was marked by the growing domination of the vertical planning and ·
administration directed by the central bureaucracies.

During 1955-57, over 80% of all budgetary ,
I

investment was controlled directly by and channeled to the central-state sector. Between the central and ·
local governments, the Center took 80 % of the total state revenue during the 1st FYP, 30 while the ratio
of total state expenditure between the central and twenty-nine local governments in the same period was
75 to 25. 31

The centrally allocated goods increased from 55 categories in 1952 to 523(!) in 1957. Among
these centrally allocated goods, not only did the number of raw materials and producer goods subject to
'

unified distribution increase from less than 30 in 1952 to well over 380 by 1956, but the poi;tion of total
output of these products entering state distribution channels also rose. 32

16

Provincially and locally

'

.
I

concentrations of population and industry, were vulnerable to foreign seizure and bombingi attacks; but
the third front was the secure base area in the mountainous interior. The "Third Front" Strategy stressed

I

the need to build up one or several economic centers in the interior area for the purpose o, minimizing
the loss of industrial assets and productivity located in the first and second fronts in the event of war."

This "Third Front" strategy of 1964-1971, however, was first and foremost redistributive. It

.

I

increased the military budget and elevated the importance of the military in the socialist development and
reconstruction so that the military could interfere the daily economic activities. A coalitif n was built ,
between Mao and Lin Biao and his associates in the Fourth Field Army. With the U.S. jbombing of I
North Vietnam in early 1965 and then tensions with the Soviet Union escalating to

'

bord~r

clashes in

I

1969, the coalition used these events to accelerate the building of the "Third Front." The predominant
guideline at that time was "Be ready to fight a war against invasion and famine for the peop+' (Beizhan,

I

I
I

beihuang, wei renmin).

I
I

The provincial leaders also benefitted from a system of "self-reliance," or a small-but- ·

I
:
comprehensive (xiao er quan) system, that was implemented as both an economic program as~.ociated with ~
I
the "Third Front" strategy and a strategy against the excessive concentration of central bureaucratic :

power.

In terms of economic management, this system was intended to simplify baordinative

I
I

I
'

requirements in the economy by localizing allocation decisions and minimizing external links, so that :
:I
'
residual planning functions were carried out by a smaller, less articulated, and more politically ,
controllable bureaucracy.

In his campaign for the first decentralization in 1956-58, Mao Zedong must have 1noticed that ·
some poor--inland--provinces asked for more central subsidies rather than for a "sLf-reliance"
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i

'

decentralization reform." The new military strategy shifted investment from the north arid northeast,
I

where it was concentrated in the 1st FYP, to build heavy industry in inland provinces away from the i

i

'

militarily vulnerable industrial coastal and northeast areas. At the peak of the implementlition of this

I

strategy, two-third of national budgeted industrial investment went to the third front. 57 If some Jess-

i

developed provinces were not very enthusiastic about the first decentralization program in 1957-58, they
would definitely be pleased to see a third front to be built in their own barren garden. kother solid
coalition was built between Mao and provincial leaders.

Although the military plan reallocated some investment and large enterprises away from the first

I

f

I

two fronts, the provinces there could take over those left-overs from the central ministries and enjoyed

1

the newly decentralized power. In 1965, provincial authorities were permitted to distribute the output !

I

of the five small industries, which included small steel and iron, small cement, small fertilizer, small !

'

coal, and small machine industries. 58 This part of the new policy represented a great benefit to the local :
,governments because of the severe scarcity of these products. In an economy lacking of effifient market :
exchange because of state regulations, it is highly desirable for the local governments to exercise control I
I

'

I

over scarce producer goods.

Moreover, a Central Planning Conference held in February 1970 called, according to the principle '
'

I

of self-reliance, for each provincial government to establish an independent and comprehensiye industrial
system, which again put the provincial authority in charge. On March 5, 1970, the State C~uncil issued ,
I
instructions that most of the enterprises administered by the Center should be transferred to provincial
governments and the rest of them should be under dual leadership. 59 A decentralization program in
I

resource allocation also reduced the centrally controlled materials from 592 in 1965 to 217
Center only retained those crucial producer goods.

hl 1972.
I
I

'
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The

'

.
Although the alliance between Mao Zedong and provincial leaders was intended to gain more
'

power for themselves, the Cultural Revolution radically distorted the decentralization project by
emasculating the administrative authority at both central and local levels through

mobil~ing young, i

zealous Red Guards, while replacing the order under the military control.
'
!

I

'

II

When someone reaches a paramount position, he does not need to align with anybody to maintain I

his power, but needs to maintain a balance among different rival coalitions at his left and right to support ,
his paramount position. At the time when Mao secured his paramount position, his military coalition

I'
to fight back on the economic policies and launched two unsuccessful campaigns for vertical ~anagement I
'

dissolved because of the treasonable death of Lin Biao in 1971. The central bureaucrats go:t the chance

and professional specialization. Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Zhou

E~ai

I
were the I

patrons of central bureaucratic planning, which opposed Maoist mobilization approach during;the Cultural

i

Revolution. In order to keep a balance among all coalitions,"' Mao did not suppress the radical coalition

'

'

of "red generalists" and ideology/theory workers, headed by Zhang Chunqiao and Mao's wife Jiang Qing, ,
!

'

although he criticized the "Gang of Four" of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang
Hongwen for several times. 61

In the early 1970s after the Lin Biao incident, recentralization was attempted by the central :

planners headed by Zhou Enlai with the emphasis on a coherent national planning and on specialization
in management along the vertical line. For instance, the State Council under Zhou Enlai drafted "the
Summary of the 1972 National Planning conference," emphasizing the need for a unifiel) state plan,
enterprise rectification, and the establishment of systems and regulations. In October 1912, the State
Planning Commission with the support of Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun drafted "the Regulation! Concerning

I
I

the Insistence on Unified Planning, and the Strengthening of Economic Management," emphasizing the
I

I
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,

I

f

'

I

rectification theme. These early efforts were rebutted by the "Gang of Four" who got their support from
non-bureaucrats and non-professionals. In the mid 1970s, with the return of Deng Xiaoping, the central

I

planners tried to resume more central control and rectify industrial management. But the ,fforts again

I

rendered unsuccessfully due to the ruthless political attacks on Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai from the
"Gang of Four."

[

I

I

The Cultural Revolution ended with a mixture of centralization and decentralization programs.
'

After the death of Mao in September and the arrest of the "Gang of Four" in October 1976, power ·
'

'

'

I

I

struggle still went on between Hua Guofeng, the successor appointed by Mao in early 1976, 'and the vast '
veteran coalition of the Party, the military, and the bureaucrats, led by Deng Xiaoping. IJ;ua Guofeng:
was still on the leftist track without much significant change in both political style and economic policies.
While economic crisis and succession crisis at the end of the Cultural Revolution demanded a reform, .
'

the institutional structure and norms of politics left by Maoism constrained any radical imoves, but ·

I
produced an imbalanced decentralization program with slow-pace reform in the allocation iof producer
I
'

goods.

In the power struggle against Hua Guofeng and thereafter, the blockade or challenge to Deng's

power came from several directions. To the blockade of the "red generalists" and the Culturai Revolution
upstarts, Deng aligned with the central planners and professionals headed by Chen Yun and intellectual ,
elites, and advocated simultaneously both a centralized "administrative approach" 62 in planning and
management and a "from-Party-secretaries-to-administrators-and-directors" decentralization reform in the
late 1970s. 63 The "Scientific Spring" championed by Deng characterized the professionalization reform

!

emphasizing the technical knowledge.

It implied that the Party cadres--the "red genbralists"--are

I

' the central
incompetent to, therefore should not, manage the socialist reconstruction. To the challenges of

'
25

'

I

~

f

planners, Deng aligned with the provincial leaders represented by Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li, and
advocated an administrative decentralization to the provincial level.

Coalition with both central planners and provincial interests at the same time requir1 that Deng
Xiaoping help the two to reach a compromise. This temporary compromise package produc1 a division
I
I

of power with the central agencies controlling the producer goods industries and the provinces controlling
I

other industries. 64

CONCLUSION
I

This paper answers the question of why decentralization takes place in China by analyzing the
norms and institutions of the Chinese planned economy, where three groups of the ruling elites are
engaged in contrived-surplus-seeking activities.

The competition for political leadership is constant in China. Since there is no Jed terms of ,

l
office and the legitimacy of a leadership is built through persuasion and bargaining, evert paramount
I

leaders like Mao and Deng had to actively engage in policy initiation in order to maintain ,a balance of i
power under them. In China where politics and policy are fused, contestants for power will promote
policy formulas based on selective allocation which enable them to reap political support.

Th~

"functional

I

differentiation" between the ministerial and provincial management of the planned economy jias provided
opportunities for central leaders to engage in power maneuvering in forms of decentralization.
i

The planned economy creates a huge contrived surplus. The economic policy-making procedure
and reciprocity politics allow an exchange of the authority to control and/or enjoy the bJnefits of the,

I
'

,

contrived surplus by three groups of the ruling elites. Trade of the contrived surplus pro~uces mutual:

I
I
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'

'·

J

1

private benefits at the expense of the third party. While engaging in power struggle, the tiao-kuai
planning and administrative systems are the two major approaches that the central leaders, can use for I
I

soliciting political support as well as hurting political rivals. Decentralization results frotlt successful
I

political alignment between some central leaders and provincial officials. The policy instrukents could

I

be the mass mobilization strategy of the Great Leap Forward, the "self-reliance" and the "Third Front"

!
military strategy of the Cultural Revolution, or the "Scientific Spring" (Kexue de Chuntian) stressing the
technical knowledge in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.

This study does not argue for a mono-causal factor of decentralization, but maintains that '
I

reallocation of the contrived surplus through decentralization does represent phases in the struggle for
i

power and attempts by the central leaders to solicit political support and hurt political rivals. The study i'
I
I

shows that while preferences are constrained by ideology and other political norms, the central leaders I
.
I
I

would seek the most available institutional tools to pursue their power or implement their poliCies. Rather .

I

,

than allocating power to local enterprise directors, the central leaders preferred a decenttalization of i
I
I

decision-making authority to provincial and municipal officials and Party cadres, or

~ven

I

!

central 1
I

ministerial bureaucrats.
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averag~ and above1

the-average provinces to support a decentralization program. First, provinces would retain a large
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percentage of revenue, sometimes larger than the proportion remitted to the central gove$unent. For
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